FROM SUSPICION TO ACCUSATION by FRAENKEL, OSMOND K.
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES
FROM SUSPICION TO ACCUSATION
OSMOND K. FRAENKELt
W\'HOEVER sets out to formulate rules for the administration of the
criminal law is confronted with the limitations on the power of the
Government embodied in the Bill of Rights. It is a commonplace that
these provisions result in some impairment of the efficiency of law en-
forcement agencies. But it is-part of our fundamental belief that this
price is worth paying, since it safeguards the freedom of the whole
population. Perhaps nowhere is this conflict between the rights of the
individual and the safety of the state more acute than in that part of
criminal procedure with which we are here concerned. For at every step,
from suspicion through indictment, the police and prosecutors are re-
stricted by constitutional guaranties which sometimes thwart their desires.
In many fields some restrictions may be found desirable beyond those
required by the Bill of Rights. Thus the Congress has outlawed wire-
tapping,' despite the Ohnstead decision 2 that this form of detective
enterprise is not barred by the Fourth Amendment. In each instance
consideration must be given to conflicting public interests: the need of
the state that crime be detected and punished, and the equally great need
that the agencies of crime detection do not become agencies of oppres-
sion. We shall endeavor to keep these various threads in mind as we
proceed. There are two main fields into which this portion of the subject
falls: efforts to obtain evidence from the suspect himself (for other
methods of securing evidence generally raise no problems); and the
various steps by which the suspect is brought to the bar of justice.
OBTAINING EVIDENCE FROM THE SUSPECT
When suspicion of crime arises, we are met with the conflict we have
already mentioned. How can suspicion be turned into certainty, or, at
least, into proof sufficient to be taken account of in the courts? Easy
ways are to tap the telephone of the suspect, to install a dictograph in
his room, or to place a detectaphone on the walls outside, in order to
hear what he says; to raid his house and office so as to be able to scru-
tMember of the New York Bar. Author of books and of articles in various legal
periodicals.
1. Communications Act, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1940), Nardone
v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
2. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928) (Justices Holmes, Brandeis,
Butler and Stone dissented).
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tinize his private papers; finally, to call him in and, if he refuses to talk,
to use that silence against him later- if, indeed, he he not "third
degreed" into confession. This section will consider the restrictions
which have been placed around the use of these methods of detection.
Wiretapping. Although this convenient method of obtaining proof
of crime has until now been held to he not within the protection of the
Fourth Amendment,3 it has been banned by legislation. Congress has
declared it objectionable because of the inevitable invasion of the privacy
of many persons in addition to the particular suspect and because it offers
an easy opportunity for blackmail. Successive Attorneys General' have
heretofore been unable to convince Congress ,of the propriety of wire-
tapping even when restricted to such crimes as sabotage, espionage and
kidnapping, and where it was proposed to allow the tapping only on
direct authorization from the Attorney General.
It is difficult to see how any rule dealing with wiretapping could he
promulgated without departing from principles which Congress has fre-
quently refused to modify. But if the subject he considered open, the
New York law should be studied. In New York, by recent constitutional
amendment, 5 wiretapping has been prohibited except by court order based
on an affidavit showing probable cause - thus analgizing this method
of inquiry to the search warrant. It should be kept in mind, however,
that the analogy is imperfect. The secrecy of wiretapping and the long
period of time during which it is generally practiced make it particularly
susceptible to abuse. Search warrants can be directed solely at the perso n
under suspicion; tapping of telephone wires necessarily involves over-
hearing conversations of many persons not at all suspect. This is par-
ticularly so when a hotel or pay station wire is tapped, as has often
been the case.' Furthermore, wiretapping involves search for evidence,
as distinct from search for instrumentalities of crime-and search for
3. See note 2 supra. The question may be reconsidered by the Supreme Court in
Goldman v. United States, 118 F. (2d) 310 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), 'cri. grawcd, 6 Sup.
Ct. 119 (1941).
4. See S. 3756, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); H. J. Res. 571, 7ith Cong., 3d Ses.
(1940); H. R. 2266, H. R. 3099 and H. R. 4228, 77th Cong., lt Sess. (1941, and
particularly the hearings on the latter group.
5. N. Y. CoxsT., Art. I, § 12 provides: "The right of the people t, be secure
against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall nut
be violated and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation
that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained,
and identifying the particular means of communication, and particularly describing the
person or persons whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof."
6. See Record on Appeal, p. 186 ff.. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379
(1937); Record on Appeal, pp. 137, 140. 143, United States v. Brunu, 105 F. (2d)
921 (C. C.A. 2d, 1939). Cf. Hearings before Senate C omnnittee on Ptdblic Lands an
nomination of E. K. Burltu 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 95.
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evidence is unconstitutional.7 In this connection conversations in which
past criminal acts are recited may be distinguished from conversations
in which a crime is being planned- the latter, like instrumentalities of
crime, being liable to seizure or tapping. But in no case should the
rule against wiretapping be relaxed without requiring advance judicial
scrutiny of the propriety of the tapping and providing judicial review
if the wiretaps are instrumental in procuring conviction.
Notice should be taken here, also, of the cases which have ruled that
not only the wiretaps themselves are banned, but also any material ob-
tained by their use.8 The most interesting variation is the Goldslein
case,9 now awaiting decision by the Supreme Court. In that case a large
number of persons were charged with conspiring to defraud insurance
companies by presenting fake disability claims. Two of the perspus
involved pleaded guilty and testified for the Government against others
who claimed innocence. The defendants urged that the two who had
confessed should not be allowed to testify, claiming that the confessions
had been procured by illegal wiretapping. The trial court, after an exten-
sive preliminary hearing, admitted the testimony on the ground that the
defendants had failed to sustain the burden of showing that the tapping
was the inducing cause of the confessions. The Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held this error since the burden should have been
placed upon the Government. Although the Government had failed in
its burden, the Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. One ground of
decision, admitted by the Government to have been mistaken,1" was that
the Communications Act1' which prohibits wiretapping did not prohibit
use of the wiretaps; the court also held that the defendants who were
brought to trial could not object since none of their own conversations
had been illegally overheard - on this point a decision from the Supreme
Court may be forthcoming by the time this paper appears."
7. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
8. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1940); Weiss v. United States, 308
U. S. 321 (1940).
9. Goldstein v. United States, 120 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. granted,
62 Sup. Ct. 89 (1941).
10. In its brief in opposition to application for certiorari, p. 16, u. 9, the Govern-
ment conceded that the Communications Act as construed by Nardone v. United States,
308 U. S. 338 (1940), forbids the use of information derived from wiretaps. But in
its brief after certiorari was granted, the Government argued that the prohibition win'
limited to a use for some private purpose and that, while the use of contents of inter-
cepted messages was forbidden, use of their existence was not.
11. See note 1 supra.
12. The forthcoming decision may, however, ignore this point, since the Govern-
ment argues that the trial court had properly found that the wiretapping was not the
inducing cause of the testimony. The Court had followed its similar ruling in the
related case of United States v. Weiss, 34 F. Supp. 99 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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To some extent, this involves the question whether a person can object
to the unconstitutional seizure of papers from the possession of another.
The lower federal courts have uniformly held that only those who claim
ownership or right of possession in the property can object to its
seizure.' 3 The Supreme Court may, of course, in the Goldstein case
reject the analogy and, without passing on the search and seizure ques-
tion, rule only on the effect of the Communications Act.'" In that event
the codifying committee must determine whether, in relati.n to searches,
the rules should impose restrictions not required by the Constitution on
the use of evidence unconstitutionally seized; to allow a defendant, for
example, to challenge material so seized from a third person which is
to be used against him. The rules should, therefore, take cognizance
of this type of situation by outlining a procedure for the conduct of the
necessary preliminary hearing and specifying who could complain of
both illegal wiretapping or seizure.
Dictographs and Detectaphones. Both these devices consist of micro-
phones. The dictograph is put inside the room in which it is expected
that the conversations will take place and is connected by wires to listeners
on the outside; its installation thus ordinarily involves a trespass. The
detectaphone is put outside the room, on the exterior wall (or, in case
of adjoining rooms, on the dividing wall) ; thus its installation may not
involve a trespass. In the case of the dictograph the voices are directly
picked up by the microphone; in the case of the detectaphone they are
picked up through the wall. This latter device amounts to a "tapping"
of walls, rather than of wires.
There is as yet no Supreme Court pronouncement with regard to either
of these devices, though, by the time this article appears in print, that
Court in the Goldman case' may have clarified the status of the detec-
taphone. The trial court assumed in that case that had the conversati, is
been overheard through a dictograph (which was actually installed, but
found ineffective) they would have been inadmissible as the product of
a trespass, and thus of an unconstitutional search. But the detectaphune
was considered merely a form of eavesdropping by both the trial court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the conversations were admitted.
13. See the cases from Moy Wing Sun Y. Prentis, 234 Fed. 24 C. C. A. 7th, 11h(),
to Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. (2d) 629 (C. C.A. 2d, 193b); cf. United State! v.
Bernava, 95 F. (2d) 310 (C.C.A. 2d, 1938).
14. There is room for the conclusion that, since the law expressly prihits the
use of prohibited wiretaps, anyone can object to such use, whereas the policy of the
Fourth Amendment does not require a similar extension of the rule. Mureower, the
point may not be decided at all because of the Government's contentiun on the facts.
See note 12 supra.
15. 118 F. (2d) 310 (C. C.A. 2d, 1941), cert. granted, 02 Sup. Ct. 119 (1941).
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Regardless of the outcome of this case, the situation seems to be one
in which the New York wiretapping rule can be applied. Investigating
officers should not be allowed to use such devices at their discretion; nor
is the requirement that they secure authorization from their superior
officers, or from the Attorney General, a sufficient safeguard. Sonie
prior judicial supervision should be imposed, some disclosure made of
the facts justifying the use of either of these extraordinary listening
devices. Of course the papers on which the judge acted need not be filed
at the time the device is employed, but they should be available for later
scrutiny should the conversations so overheard be used at a trial. Such
a limitation would curb reckless use of these devices, although it must
be admitted that similar restrictions on the use of search warrants have
not done away with all abuses.
Searches and Seizures. This rather fully developed field of law has
been extensively commented upon."0 The proposed rules would, there-
fore, do little more than codify the decisions. They would concern them-
selves with the situations under which searches might be made without
any warrant;"7 with the facts which must be stated"8 and the formalities
which must be observed to obtain a warrant;19 with the particularity
with which the premises to be searched and objects to be seized must be
described ;20 with the manner in which the warrant must be executed ;-1
and with the nature of the property which may be seized. 2
We have already, under the head of wiretapping, discussed the ques-
tion of the scope of the Fourth Amendment with regard to the right of
one person to object to the seizure of the property of another and the
16. See CoRNELIUS, SE.Aci AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1930); LASSON, Tuu HisToRY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1937); Atkinson, Admissibility of
Evidence Obtaized through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures (1925) 25 Cot,. L.
REV. 11; Fraenkel, Conecrning Searches and Seiznres (1921) 34 HARv, L. REv. 301;
Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1929) 13 MIN N.
L. REv. 1; Harno, Evidcncc Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure (1925) 19 ILL.
L. REv. 303; Wood, The Scope of the Constitutional Inuuunity against Searches and
Seizures (1927) 34 W. VA. L. Q. 1.
17. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Agnello v. United States,
269 U. S. 20 (1925); Husty v. United States, 282 U. S. 694 (1931) ; Turner v, Cainp,
123 F. (2d) 840 (C. C.A. 5th, 1941).
18. See Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927) ; Steele v. United States
No. 1, 267 U. S. 498 (1925) ; Dumbra v. United States, 268 U. S. 435 (1925).
19. See Davis v. United States, 35 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Nixon v.
United States, 36 F. (2d) 316 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) ; Rose v. United States, 45 F. (2d)
459 (C. C.A. 8th, 1930).
20. See Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927).
21. See Nuckols v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 353 (App. D. C. 1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 626 (1938); Moore v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932);
Rettick v. United States, 84 F. (2d) 118 (C. C.A. 1st, 1936).
22. See Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
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extent to which the rules might deal with that subject. Also the rules
might abolish certain other limitations on the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment, which have been imposed by holdings of the Supreme Court.
For instance, the Supreme Court has held that evidence is admissible,
though seized without right by private persons,02 or by state officers. -4
The rules might undo these rulings and require the rejection of such
evidence. And the rules might embody the result reached by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in NVwslein To. District' which"
rejected an admission made to an officer during an illegal search.
Admissions. Generally speaking, admissions freely made are admis-
sible in evidence against a defendant. And while it was form.&dy sup-
posed that admissions required corroboration, the Supreme Court has
recently ruled otherwise where the admissions were made before the
commission of the crime under prosecution.2 Whether the rules should
concern themselves with these subjects is doubtful. However, to tie
extent that admissions are obtained by the police or prosecutor they
come directly within our subject. We have already considered admis-
sions made consequent upon an illegal search. We must consider also
admissions obtained as the result of the violation of various other rights,
such as prolonged police questioning or the use of the third degree.
Two constitutional principles merge here - the right to be free from
self-incrimination and the right to due process of law, both guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment. In consequence of these it is settled that an
accused may not be compelled to make a statement,2 and may, therefore,
remain silent when accused,2 except, perhaps, when confronted by an
accusing co-defendant.2  If, however, he does talk, what he says may
23. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. 5. 465 (1921).
24. See Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28 (1927); Gambino v. United States,
275 U. S. 310 (1927); United States v. Yee Doo, 41 F. Supp. 039 (ri). 'Macs. 1941).
25. 115 F. (2d) 690 (App. D. C. 1941).
26. Warszower v. United States, 312 U. S. 342 (1941). For a statement ff the
general rule see Pines v. United States, 123 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942).
27. See United States v. Sprengel, 103 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A..3d, 1939).
28. The cases have been collected in Notes (1938) 115 A.L.R. 1510, (1932)
80 A.L.R. 1235. For a curious variant see Rocchia v. United States, 78 F. (2d)
966 (C. C.A. 9th, 1935).
29. The state of the law is in considerable doubt. The Supreme Court has aid,
by way of dictum, that it is proper to admit in evidence statements made by one pris.oner
in the presence of another, the latter having remained silent, "under such circumstances
as would warrant the inference that he would naturally have contradicted them if he
did not assent to their truth." Sparf v. United States. 156 U. S. 51, 16 (1895). But
in Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897), the Court concluded that a statement
made by the accused after arrest was not a voluntary one because induced by the fear
that his failure to make any answer to an accusation would be held against him. In
Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. (2d) 824 (App. D. C. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S.
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be used against him unless he is induced to speak by fear or threats.30
The use of variants of the third degree, such as prolonged questioning,
also bars admissions." The rules can well formulate the basic positions
judicially established, settle the conflict with regard to statements by a
co-defendant and make clear that there is a duty on the part of police and
prosecutor alike to advise every accused person not only that he need
make no statement but also that his silence cannot be held against hih.
'Admissions should be barred not only when obtained illegally, but also
when this warning has not been given.
BRINGING THE SUSPECT INTO COURT
Since the only constitutional limitations are the restrictions on the
issuance of warrants of arrest contained in the Fourth Amendment and
the indictment provisions of the Fifth, the rule-making committee may
exercise a greater freedom in this field than in that of securing evidence
of crime.
Arrest. Various authorities have recognized that the present law of
arrest is unsatisfactory, due principally to an inevitable conflict between
police efficiency and ideals of freedom. Recent critical treatment of
the problem has pointed out the wide divergence between the restraints
of the law and the practical dictates of police efficiency. Specific sug-
gestions for change include -giving the police the right to do certain
things without making an arrest, such as frisking a suspect for a gtin,:-
allowihg them to discharge arrested persons without arraignment, when
innocence is manifest, 33 and placing the financial burden of police law-
lessness on the community.
3 4
665 (1933), the dictum of the Sparf case became the ground of decision. See, to like
effect, dicta in Graham v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert. denied
sub norn. O'Fallon v. United States, 274 U. S. 743 (1927), and Seeman v. United States,
90 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). Contrary conclusions were reached in McCarthy
v. United States, 25 F. (2d) 298 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) and Yep v. United States, 83 F.
(2d) 41 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936). For conflicting state decisions see A. L. R. Notes cited
supra note 28.
30. Brain v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). See also Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U. S. 278 (1936) ; McNabb v. United States, 123 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
31. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530
(1940).
32. Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 151. Professor
Warner bases his suggestions upon personal experience with police officers in various
cities.
33. Ibid. The police do these things anyway, he indicates, though with the risk of
litigation.
34. Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems (1936)
3 U. or Ci. L. REv. 345. The author emphasizes the importance of a change in
attitude toward those large categories of arrested persons such as drunks and vagrants,
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It is now well settled that federal agents may arrest without warrant
under a variety of circumstances -in certain respects having greater
power than some state police officers. For while it is universally agreed
that any officer may arrest whenever an offense is being committed or
attempted in his presence,35 or when he has reasonable cause for believ-
ing that' the arrested person conmitted the crime," there is some un-
certainty whether an arrest is justified when in fact no crime had been
committed, merely because the officer had reasonable cause to believe
that it had.
In some of the states, as in New York 7 the law authorizes an arrest
without warrant only if in fact a felony has been committed. Moreover,
it has been held in New York that the right to arrest a person suspected
of having committed a felony exists only if the officer knows that the
felony was in fact committed,3" except, perhaps, when the arrest is
made at night, when reasonable ground for belief is enough if it be
later shown that the felony was actually committed? In England and
other states an arrest may be made without a warrant if there were
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had committed a felony,
even if it later appeared that no one had committed any felony at all.4"
A recent attempt to make the New York law conform failed.
41
There is no federal statute dealing with this phase of the subject and
the cases are not sufficiently numerous or authoritative to justify a dog-
matic statement of the applicable rules. But it has been said that an
arrest is justified if the officer has reasonable cause for believing that a
felony has been committed.4 -
The right of private citizens to arrest without warrant seems to have
received little consideration in the federal courts. 43 In New York this
which swell the statistics of illegal arrests. He believes that such cases should be
treated outside the ordinary criminal law. He further stresses the necessity of imme-
diately producing prisoners before a judge, noting that only thus can the use of the
third degree be lessened, citing REP. ON LAWLESSNEsS n, LAW E .Foac&EME:, Ar.
Co.m-. ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND LAW EXFORCE.%ENr (1931).
35. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). But this does not apply
to a violator of military law. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 487 (1885).
36. See Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339 (1920). But contra as to mridemeanors.
Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U. S. 529 (1900).
37. N. Y. CODE CRIM. Paoc. § 177(3).
38. People v. Jakira, 118 Misc. 303, 193 N. Y. Supp. 3016 (N. Y. Gen. Sess. 1922).
39. N. Y. CODE Cam.I. PROc. § 179.
40. See 5 C. J. 399, 400.
41. See Legis. (1936) 5 FORD. L. Rmv. 338. The prtsposed legislatiun failed (f enact-
ment
42. See Pritchett v. Sullivan, 182 Fed. 480 (C. C.. 8th, 1910); United States v.
Rembert, 284 Fed. 996 (D. Tex. 1922).
43. See Hershey v. O'Neill, 36 Fed. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1888); Brady v. United
States, 300 Fed. 540 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 620 (1924); Collier
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right is less than that of the police officer, since the private citizen
cannot arrest merely on reasonable ground for believing that the person
to be arrested committed the crime. 4  He acts at his peril if it turns
out that the crime was not in fact committed by the person arrested.""
It seems settled, however, that a state officer may arrest for a federal
crime under the same circumstances as could a federal officer; at least
it was so decided in Marsh v. United States, 46 when the arrest was for
a crime committed in the presence of the officer. Since some of these
points have not been passed upon by the Supreme Court47 the formula-
tion of precise rules on the right to arrest without warrant would be
of great service.
An interesting sidelight on the subject of arrest is found in the case
of United States v. Wingert4 There Judge Dickinson refused to issue
a bench warrant after indictment on the ground that the United States
Attorney should have presented facts to the Court indicating probable
cause. In an eloquent opinion Judge Dickinson pointed out the dangers
which can result if, instead of affording the accused a preliminary hear-
ing before the commissioner and thus throwing light on the basis for
the accusation, the prosecutor uses secret proceedings in order to obtain
an indictment. However, the Supreme Court, in Ex parte United
States,49 unanimously rejected this view and issued a mandamus to
compel the signing of the bench warrant on the ground that the grand
jury determination of probable cause was conclusive.
Among the problems incident to arrest is the right of the authorities
to photograph or fingerprint. In New York this right had been denied
in the absence of statute. ° In United States v. Kelly 1 the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached a contrary conclusion on
the ground that fingerprinting was an appropriate method of identifi-
cation. The Court noted, however, that the Attorney General had issued
v. Vaccaro, 51 F. (2d) 17 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Backun v. United States, 112 F. (2d)
635 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940). Cf. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U. S. 41%7 (1885).
44. N. Y. CoDE GRIm. PRoc. § 183.
45. Grinnell v. Weston, 95 App. Div. 454, 88 N. Y. Supp. 781 (1st Dep't 1904);
Johnston v. Bruckheimer, 133 App. Div. 649, 118 N. Y. Supp. 189 (1st Dep't 1909)-
see also McLoughlin v. New York Edison Co., 252 N. Y. 202, 169 N. E. 277 (1929).
The proposed revision (see note 41 supra) also sought to make this change. For con-
flicting state decisions, see 5 C. J. 411-13.
46. 29 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 849 (1929) ; accord,
United States v. One Packard Truck, 55 F. (2d) 882 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
47. Many of the cases are in the field of search and seizure (see note 17 supra).
See also note 36 supra.
48. 55 F. (2d) 960 (E. D. Pa., 1932).
49. 287 U.S. 241 (1932).
50. Hawkins v. Kuhne, 153 App. Div. 216, 137 N. Y. Supp. 100 (2d Dep't 1912),
aff'd, 208 N. Y. 555, 101 N. E. 1104 (1913).
51. 55 F. (2d) 67 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932).
[Vol. 51 : 748
SUSPICION TO ACCUSATION
instructions that photographs, fingerprints and Bertillon measurements
should not be made public before trial unless the prisoner became a
fugitive and that in case of acquittal these data should be either destroyed
or surrendered. Rules embodying these instructions would be useful.
We conclude that in some respects the law governing arrests should
be brought into harmony with actual police practices. Specifically, the
right to arrest without warrant should be freed from some of the
restrictions which have been placed upon its use, and the rules should
make clear the extent to which such arrests may be made by government
agents, local police or private persons. The rules might also usefully
specify the manner in which warrants should issue and be executed.
In the interest of efficient police work, the authorities should be allowed
to fingerprint and photograph arrested persons, but in cases where the
accused is finally acquitted these records should be destroyed.
Prompt Arraignment: the Third Degree. Mistreatment of prisoners
by police eager to secure confessions is of unhappily frequent occurrence,
and is one of the chief problems facing the codifiers. It is essential
that the accused be brought into court without unreasonable delay. The
longer a man is held incommunicado, the easier it is to force a con-
fession from him, even without resort to the third degree. In the recent
case of Lisenba v. California,12 although state law provided that the
accused should be immediately arraigned, 3 the arresting officers kept
him in custody for several days, took him to the District Attorney's
office and to a private residence for prolonged questioning; later, they
again took him from jail for more questioning and, on this occasion,
refused him the right to see his attorney (also a violation of state law).1
Such practices, the Supreme Court said, "may, in the end, defeat rather
than further the ends of justice"; consequently they must be carefully
scrutinized in view of the probability of a tyrannically obtained confession.
But the majority of the Court concluded that due process had not been
infringed because the confession of a confederate rather than the pro-
longed questioning of the accused induced the confession. Mr. Justice
Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas agreed, dissented.
We have discussed this case at length because, although based on the
acts of state police, it throws light on the nature of the problem involved
in the arraignment of prisoners. Clearly the usual requirements of im-
mediate arraignment and the right to consult counsel are an insufficient
protection if statements obtained despite violation of these protections
can be used to convict. It should not lie in the mouth of prosecuting
officials who use such illegal methods in order to obtain confessions
52. 62 Sup. Ct. 280 (1941).
53. CAt. Pmx. COD (Deering, 1937) §849.
54. Id. at § 825.
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to say that, in fact, the particular confession was motivated by some
other cause. And, that the Supreme Court has sanctioned this result
as a matter of constitutional law does not absolve a rule-making body
from reconsidering the issue on broad grounds of policy.
The first question to be considered is whether the likelihood of such
occurrences can be lessened by stricter procedural requirements; the
second, whether public policy 'requires the exclusion of statements made
during illegal detention. Some years ago the American Civil Liberties
Union proposed stringent rules designed to lessen the use of the third
degree ;" the essential purpose of these rules was to remove the custody
of prisoners entirely from the control of police and prosecution and to
permit their withdrawal from jail only upon court order; the proposals
also ensured the right to counsel and to a copy of any statement taken
by the police or the district attorney. There can be no doubt that if
such provisions were effectively observed improper police practices would
be reduced to a minimum. It is clear, however, that no rule of prison
administration would ensure immediate arraignment of arrested persons.
The proposed rules would have made impossible the second questioning
of Lisenba, but not his first.
But these proposals were vigorously opposed by prosecuting officials
on the ground that they unduly hampered police work. It was argued
that the questioning of arrested persons before they have a chance to
talk with lawyers is important, not so much because of direct confes-
sions which may result, but because in this way statements are often
obtained incriminating others. The point was made that, especially when
gangs are involved, it is important for the police or prosecutor to be
able to question arrested persons before the leaders even know of the
arrest. Once the prisoner is taken to court and the gang's lawyer appears,
fright will seal a mouth otherwise ready to talk. While these contentions
have much force and indicate that there is no easy solution to the
problem, it is clear that some regulation of present practice is desirable.
Indictment or Information. Not much scope exists for rules to deter-
mine the method by which accusation may be brought to judicial scrutiny.
For the Fifth Amendment commands the use of the grand jury in all
"capital, or otherwise infamous" crimes, and the Supreme Court has
so defined these as to include all crimes punishable in a penitentiary,"0
or at hard labor."' This definition includes instances where the offense
55. Such bills were introduced in both the New York Assembly (see Ass"E . J.
162d Sess. 1939, vol. I, p. 453 Int. 1336; id. 163d Sess. 1940, vol. I, p. 44 Int. 182, It.
188) and Senate (see SEN. J. 162d Sess. 1939, vol. I, p. 291 Int. 920).
56. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417 (1885) ; Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S.
348 (1886); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896).
57. United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922).
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itself might not be serious,58 nor the imprisonment for a long period."
But there can be little doubt that the constitutional guaranty would apply
to a crime traditionally considered serious, such as burglary, even though
Congress might impose punishment in a workhouse without hard labor.
Nevertheless, there is a large field of crimes not involving malum
per se which can be prosecuted by information, depending on the extent
of the punishment. And in view of the constantly increasing number
of crimes of this category this method of prosecution will grow in im-
portance. The chief question to be considered here is whether any re-
strictions should be imposed on the institution of prosecutions by the
various United States Attorneys. The Attorney General has, from time
to time, required his approval to the institution of proceedings under
various laws- even to grand jury proceedings.-' Such action generally
has been motivated by a desire for uniformity in statutory interpreta-
tion, or, as in the case of sedition laws, has been an attempt to prevent
possible interferences with free speech. In those fields it is doubtful
whether the rules can be of any assistance.
Two problems have arisen in connection with grand jury subpoenas.
The first is whether a subpoena should be vacated if it does not disclose
either the identity of the person accused or the nature of the crime under
investigation. The law seems to be"' that a prospective witness has no
right to know these things in advance, apparently on the theory that
his readiness to tell the truth might be affected if he could consult in
advance with the suspected person. Whether or not this use of the
"John Doe" subpoena lends itself to abuse is one of the things which
must be considered in the formulation of any rules. Another problem
arises from the fact that a grand jury subpoena is subject to scrutiny
as to reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 2 The courts in
many instances have modified subpoenas by restricting their scope to
58. In United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 133 (1922), the offense was failure t'.
support minor children. Justices Brandeis, Holmes and Taft dissented on the ground
that the offense was not serious.
59. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (IS90), the imprisnment %%*as
for sLxty days; in United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922), it vras for six
months.
60. See N. Y. Times, December 22, 1941, p.21, coL3.
61. Ia re Black, 47 F. (2d) 542 (C. C.A. 2d, 1931); cf. Blair v. United State ,
250 U. S. 273 (1919). Contra: In re Shaw, 172 Fed. 520 (S. D. N. Y. 1909).
62. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906). See also Brown v. United States, 27t.
U. S. 134 (1928). For recent instances see United States v. Medical Soc. of D. C.,
26 F. Supp. 55 (D. D. C. 1938); In re American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. S5
(D. D. C. 1938); Application of Te'cs Co., 27 F. Supp. 847 (E. D. I1. 1939); In re
'Motions to Quash Subpoenas, 30 F. Supp. 527 (S. D. Cal. 1939); In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 33 F. Supp. 367 (M. D. N. C. 1940). An order denying a motion to
quash is not appealable. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940).
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matters clearly relevant to the inquiry and have relieved the prospective
witness from the burden of producing records covering an unreasonable
number of years. It is doubtful whether anything more can be done in
the rules than to paraphrase the judicial decisions ol the subject, since
each case must be considered on its own merits.
Removal Proceedings. The last step in the course from suspicion to
accusation is the availability of the accused. No problem arises, of
course, when he is found in the district where the alleged crime was
committed, or generally, when, having fled, he is apprehended else-
where. But, sometimes in this latter case, a nd almost always when a
particular defendant has never been in the place where the trial is to
take place, the attempt to remove is resisted.
There is no precise constitutional barrier to any scheme thought
desirable. The Sixth Amendment requires only that the trial shall be
held in the district where the crime was committed, and that such district
shall have been previously ascertained by law. Congress is thus left
free to determine the manner of removal and the extent to which it can
be questioned. Existing law affords the accused the right to challenge
the removal in the removal proceedings themselves." But since there
is no appeal from a removal order" it can be reviewed only through
habeas corpus proceedings." It might, for the sake of simplicity, be
desirable to change this rule so as to do away with any need for habeas
corpus as a method of review. There is no good reason why there
should be the trouble and delay incident to the habeas corpus hearing,
nor why, as existing practice apparently permits, the arrested person
should have two chances to introduce evidence."
Some problems arise in connection with the removal hearings. The
Government generally relies on the indictment as its only evidence of
probable cause that the prisoner has committed the crime, and on proof
of his identity as the person accused -these being the only facts which
may be put in issue. And on the subject of identity there is nothing
which can be considered in rules.6" With regard to probable cause, how-
ever, the situation is different, because the Supreme Court has held that
the indictment merely shifts to the prisoner the burden of showing that
there is no probable cause, and when he has done so the Government
63. United States v. Cunningham, 40 F. Supp. 399 (D. Ga. 1941).
64. Wood v. Cooper, 18 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), cert. denied, 274 U. S.
750 (1927) ; Edelstein v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 271 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), cerl. denied,
305 U. S. 617 (1938).
65. Evans v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
66. See United States ex rel. Sauerberry v. Moore, 40 F. Supp. 543 (D. Ky. 1941),
and Evans v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 315 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
67. See Mathues v. United States ex rel. Schwartz, 19 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 3d,
1927).
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must offer proof beyond the indictment itself.05 This the Government
is generally reluctant to do, partly because it dislikes having to disclose
its evidence, partly because of an unwillingness to let its witnesses be
cross-examined and often because of the expense of transpo rting the
witnesses to the place where the objecting prisoner was arrested. In
consequence, removal proceedings frequently fail and justice may be
thwarted.
For this situation there are two principal alternatives: to make the
indictment conclusive against the accused, or to provide some substitute
for testimony by living witnesses on behalf of the Government. The
first solution may be of doubtful constitutional validity, and would in
any event be unwise. For there are many cases, particularly of con-
spiracy, in which the prisoner should be allowed to prove, if lie can,
that he had no part in the alleged crime.c" Otherwise persuns might be
taken to distant places for trial on some far fetched contention that they
were responsible for a crime there committed. In cases involving groups
unpopular at the place of trial the results of unchecked removal might
be disastrous.
On the other hand the Government should have the right to compel
removal by a showing of something less than common law proof. If
the indictment itself cannot be accepted as countervailing to the accused's
testimony, why cannot the grand jury minutes play such a role? The
judge trying the removal proceedings can then form sonic judgment of
the substance of the Government's case and determine whether probable
cause exists despite the accused's proof. That the trier of the facts would
not see the witnesses who had testified before the grand jury is not
important, since he can in no event determine issues of credibility. That
these witnesses have not been subject to cross-examination is also not
a substantial argument against the proposal, since the removal proceed-
ings do not finally adjudicate anything. At least the use of grand jury
minutes in such a situation would help the Government without serious
inconvenience to it and without injustice to the accused. Unless a sub-
stantial showing of his participation in the crime was thus disclosed and
his testimony to the contrary, therefore, put in issue, there would be
68. United States cx rel Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U. S. 396 (1935). But the
Court is not bound to accept the prisoner's proofs and a removal order will be sustained
if the court has given real consideration to the evidence. United States c.v rdt. Povlin
v. Hecht, 48 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; United States ex rcl. Scharlon v. Pulver,
54 F. -(2d) 261 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Bates, 95 F.
(2d) 881 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), cert. denied sub norn. United States ex rel. Schmidt v.
Miles, 304 U. S. 583 (1938).
69. See United States v. Cunningham, 40 F. Supp. 399 tD. Ga. 1941), and United
States v. Moore, 40 F. Supp. 543 (D. Ky. 1941); cf. United States v. Motlow, 10 F.
(2d) 657, 662 (C. C.A. 7th, 1926).
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no removal. And if an issue of fact is thus created there should be no
obstacle to removal.
CONCLUSION
The function of a rule-making body is threefold. First, such a body
can formulate the state of the law insofar as constitutional provisions
affect the problem. Second, it can formulate the state of the law in
areas left free from constitutional restriction to the extent that existing
legislation or judicial decision may have established a satisfactory regu-
lation. Finally, the rule-making body may in many instances develop
regulations which either change existing statute law or judicial interpre-
tation or impose restrictions upon the activity of law enforcement agen-
cies not now in force, where the rule-making body believes such further
restrictions are in the public interest. This last function of its work
will, of course, be the most difficult. For it will require a delicate bal-
ancing of the needs of the law-enforcing arm against the equally great
need of the people that their liberties be respected. In trying to adjust
this balance the rule-making body can well consider the words of Mr.
Justice Day in Weeks v. United States"0 where he said:
"The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land."
70. 232 U. S. 383, 393 (1914). See also the dissenting opinions of Holmes and
Brandeis, JJ., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 469, 471 (1928).
[Vol. 51: 748
